When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy by Gerber, Elisabeth R & Hopkins, Daniel J
When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact
of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy
Elisabeth R. Gerber University of Michigan
Daniel J. Hopkins Georgetown University
U.S. cities are limited in their ability to set policy. Can these constraints mute the impact of mayors’ partisanship on policy
outcomes? We hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly affect outcomes in policy areas where there is less
shared authority between local, state, and federal governments. To test this hypothesis, we create a novel dataset combining
U.S. mayoral election returns from 1990 to 2006 with city fiscal data. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that
cities that elect a Democratic mayor spend a smaller share of their budget on public safety, a policy area where local discretion
is high, than otherwise similar cities that elect a Republican or an Independent. We find no differences on tax policy, social
policy, and other areas that are characterized by significant overlapping authority. These results suggest that models of
national policymaking are only partially applicable to U.S. cities. They also have implications for political accountability:
mayors may not be able to influence the full range of policies that are nominally local responsibilities.
America’s large cities differ widely, but a contem-porary observer could sum up their shared fis-cal situations in one word: austerity. The cur-
rent economic recession is taking a heavy toll on already
stretched city budgets, leaving many cities struggling to
meet their service obligations in the wake of sharply de-
clining revenues. City revenues that derive largely from
property taxes are tumbling with the collapse of the hous-
ing market and waves of foreclosures (Hoene and Pagano
2009; Pagano and Hoene 2008). State transfers to cities
are plummeting as state governments deal with their own
revenue shortfalls (Eaton 2009). At the same time, de-
mand for social services is growing as unemployment
numbers rise (Hubert 2008). Local officials face a great
deal of pressure to balance their budgets, continue to
provide high-quality services, and avoid layoffs of public
employees.
In this article, we investigate whether mayors’ politi-
cal preferences are likely to shape their responses to these
(and other) fiscal pressures. Do Democratic mayors differ
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in their fiscal policies from Republicans or Independents?
Does partisanship lead cities to adopt significantly dif-
ferent fiscal policies? Political science research is far from
clear on the matter, offering two opposing perspectives.
Scholarship on U.S. national politics has demonstrated
the dominance of partisan considerations in shaping pol-
icy outcomes. This body of research has shown repeat-
edly that the two major parties have distinct electoral
coalitions and governing philosophies that lead to quite
different policy outcomes, especially on issues of taxing
and spending (Aldrich 1995; Bartels 2008; Gerring 1998;
Hacker and Pierson 2005; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). In national politics,
partisanship appears to be a kind of theoretical “skele-
ton key” that is commonly invoked to explain both voter
decision-making and elite policy choices (Goren 2005;
Green et al. 2002; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).
Moreover, party polarization, at least among elites, has
grown in recent years (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006;
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).
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By contrast, scholars of urban politics have consis-
tently emphasized the economic, political, and legal con-
straints facing local policymakers (Leigh 2007; Nivola
2002; Peterson 1981, 1995; Rae 2003; Self 2003; Tiebout
1956). Indeed, given the overwhelming emphasis on con-
straints in past studies of urban politics, it is unclear what
policy influence mayors or other local political officials
can have even under normal conditions. By extension, it
is also unclear that mayors of one political party are able
to govern in distinctive ways. The old adage that there
is no Republican or Democratic way to collect trash, at-
tributed to New York’s Mayor LaGuardia, appears quite
compatible with the reigning theories of urban politics.
We thus have two theoretical approaches, each dom-
inant within its domain, which make very different pre-
dictions about the impact of partisanship on local policy.
Given the strength of partisanship in national politics,
and given that the same two major parties compete in
many local elections, we might expect partisan control
of city government to systematically influence local pol-
icy. Democratic mayors might pursue increased taxes and
expanded services, and Republican mayors might pur-
sue tax cuts and service reductions, just as their national
counterparts do. Alternately, if the various constraints on
urban policymakers are binding, the impact of mayoral
partisanship might prove negligible, as cities act based
on fiscal and economic conditions rather than political
ones. This article tests these competing possibilities, fo-
cusing on the nature and extent of constraints faced by
local policymakers in various areas of urban fiscal policy.
In doing so, it evaluates the applicability of prominent
theoretical explanations of national-level politics to local
policymaking.
Foreshadowing our empirical results, we find that
mayors’ partisanship is an important determinant of fis-
cal outcomes in some policy areas where local decision
makers are less constrained by political actors at other
levels of the U.S. federal system. Yet it is negligible in ar-
eas where federal and state actors exert more authority. In
other words, models of the effects of partisanship on pol-
icymaking apply to some areas of local politics but not to
others. These conditional results should encourage schol-
ars of local politics to carefully consider the applicability
of models of national politics. They should also prompt
scholars of national politics to consider when and how
national actors exert influence over other actors within
the federal system.
We proceed as follows. The next section integrates
theories of political partisanship and theories of urban
political constraint. Past research has pointed to both for-
mal constraints on the local policymaking process, such
as legal restrictions on what local governments can do,
and informal constraints, such as the political and eco-
nomic environment in which cities operate. While cities
may indeed be constrained, these constraints are neither
insurmountable nor universal; we expect the constraints
cities face to vary across policy areas. We focus in particu-
lar on the constraints imposed by the division of authority
within the U.S. federal system. In policy areas where cities
share authority with federal and state government actors,
such as housing and transportation, we hypothesize that a
mayor’s partisanship will have a limited influence on pol-
icy. In areas where there is less shared authority, such as
policing and public safety, we hypothesize that a mayor’s
partisanship will more strongly influence policy.
Empirically, we test this hypothesis using a novel
dataset of 134 mayoral elections in large U.S. cities from
1990 to 2006.1 In the third section, we describe our data
set, which includes cities with partisan elections as well
as those with nonpartisan elections where the two lead-
ing candidates were known to be from different parties.
Together with data from the U.S. Census of Governments
and the Annual Survey of Governments databases, these
new data allow us to estimate the influence of a mayor’s
partisanship on a wide range of tax and spending policies,
as detailed below. To confront concerns about the poten-
tial endogeneity of partisanship, we use regression discon-
tinuity design (RDD), an increasingly common statistical
technique that can recover the causal impact of parti-
sanship by comparing outcomes in cities that witness a
narrow victory by a mayoral candidate of one political
party to outcomes in similar cities where there was a
narrow victory by a candidate of a different party (Fer-
reira and Gyourko 2009; Green et al. 2009; Imbens and
Lemieux 2007; Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004; Leigh 2007;
Trounstine forthcoming).
The fourth section reports our empirical results.
Consistent with the observation that constraints vary
across policy areas, we find that mayoral partisanship in-
fluences spending on some policies but not others. Those
cities that elect a Democratic mayor by a slim margin can
expect the share of their budget devoted to police spend-
ing to be approximately 2 percentage points lower three
years later, and their fire spending to be approximately
1 percentage point lower, than if they had elected a Re-
publican mayor.2 However, other spending areas and city
revenue streams, over which cities have only limited dis-
cretion, show no strong partisan influence. The article’s
1 The data set is available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/
dvn/dv/DJHopkins. Other supporting information is available at
www.danhopkins.org.
2 The comparison of Democratic victories to Republican victories
is arbitrary, as all estimates provide the impact of one party’s victory
relative to a victory by the other party.
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empirical results prove highly robust: they do not appear
in placebo tests described below, but they do persist ir-
respective of the independent variables and functional
forms employed, the number of elections included in the
data set, and other analysis decisions.
These findings help us understand the constraints
that bind city policy. They illustrate that those constraints
allow for mayoral influence in certain policy areas while
severely limiting the impact of partisanship and partisan
polarization on other local policy outcomes. When par-
tisan mayors are less constrained, they can act on their
own preferences and/or be responsive to their partisan
constituents in ways that are not available when they are
more severely constrained. Contemporary work on na-
tional politics would suggest that partisanship is a power-
ful influence in American politics. The results presented
here suggest a more nuanced story, at least for local gov-




This section builds upon the large literatures on par-
tisanship, urban politics, and public policy to generate
hypotheses about the impact of local government parti-
sanship on policy outcomes. Developed to explain polit-
ical processes at two different levels of government, these
literatures generate contradictory expectations about the
impact of local partisanship. This section seeks to inte-
grate those literatures to develop hypotheses about when
partisanship is likely to influence local policy outcomes.
It suggests that we should expect the degree of constraint
on local partisan officials, and hence their ability to shape
policy outcomes, to systematically vary by policy area.
Partisanship and Local Government
We begin with the literature on partisanship at the na-
tional level. The strong and robust conclusion of this
research is that partisan differences are key factors in ex-
plaining the policy preferences of citizens and decision
makers. At the level of individual citizens, partisan iden-
tification is a more stable predictor of vote choice than
demographic characteristics or ideology (Campbell et al.
1960; Goren 2005; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002)
and is thought to be a central heuristic through which
voters make decisions (Popkin 1994; Schaffner, Streb,
and Wright 2001). The partisanship of elected officials
also proves an unparalleled predictor of changes in pub-
lic policy at the federal (Bartels 2008; Clinton, Jackman,
and Rivers 2004; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Krehbiel 1998;
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Poole and Rosenthal
1997) and state (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002;
Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Wright and Schaffner
2002) levels. The fact that party labels are consistently
associated with policy positions allows voters to differen-
tiate candidates based on their likely actions in office.
Yet despite the sustained attention to partisan iden-
tification, there have been few studies of its influence
across the levels of the U.S. federal system (but see Ferri-
era and Gyourko 2009; Niemi, Wright, and Powell 1987;
Schleicher 2007). Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002,
44) argue that partisan identification is a social identity
and that American voters do not have separate partisan
identifications at the local, state, and national levels. If
this is true, then we might expect party labels in local
politics to function largely as they do in national poli-
tics. Democratic mayoral candidates should be associated
with increased social spending and higher, more progres-
sive taxation. Republicans should be associated with in-
creased spending on “defense-like” policies such as public
safety, and lower, more regressive taxation.
Alternately, it is plausible that national partisan la-
bels do not influence local elections (see also Leigh 2007),
which may instead be decided using alternate cues such
as a candidate’s race, endorsements, or personal char-
acteristics. Certainly, the presence of Republican mayors
in overwhelmingly Democratic cities—consider Rudolph
Giuliani in New York or Richard Riordan in Los Angeles—
provides a hint that partisanship may function differ-
ently at the local level. But exactly how partisanship in-
fluences local elections and local governance is not well
understood.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) provide a valuable start-
ing place for answering these questions. Their research an-
alyzes data for 413 cities from 1950 to 2005 to estimate the
impact of partisanship on local public finances. It finds no
strong relationships, and attributes the null findings to the
relative homogeneity of preferences within a given city.
Their research draws on Tiebout (1956) by arguing that
individuals sort into localities based on their preferences,
meaning that there is insufficient preference diversity to
generate party competition on policy grounds in a given
city. The resulting prediction: mayoral partisanship will
have consistently null effects across all areas of city taxes
and revenues.
Cities’ Constraints
We develop a different hypothesis about fiscal policy out-
comes by drawing on research on urban constraints. The
U.S. federal system is characterized by high degrees of
MAYORAL PARTISANSHIP 329
overlapping authority between the federal, state, and lo-
cal governments (Grodzins 2000). Unlike the U.S. states,
American cities have no independent constitutional sta-
tus; they are creatures of the states and derive their powers
and authority wholly from state constitutions and statutes
(Briffault 1990).3 In addition, there are numerous state-
level statutory or constitutional constraints on specific
local policies, particularly in the area of taxation (Ladd
and Yinger 1989, chap. 6).4 Beyond these structural con-
straints, there are a great many areas in which respon-
sibility over policy is shared between levels of govern-
ment (Berman 2003; Craw 2006; Nivola 2002; Peterson
1995). Examples include direct federal and state man-
dates on local governments (as in the areas of national
security and education) and federal-state-local partner-
ships (as in surface transportation policy). Federal and
state governments also exert control over local policy by
providing money (e.g., block grants for policies such as
housing, community development, and welfare). Apart
from these legal, institutional, and financial constraints,
cities also face well-known fiscal limitations stemming
from economic competition (Bailey and Rom 2004; Ladd
and Yinger 1989; Peterson 1981; Rae 2003). Given this
litany of constraints, it is unsurprising that past work
commonly concludes that political factors have little in-
fluence on state (Leigh 2007) and local (Craw 2006; Mor-
gan and Watson 1995; Peterson 1981; Ruhil 2003; but see
Wolman, Strate, and Melchior 1996) policy outputs.
By contrast, some areas of public policy are viewed
as the domain of local governments. For example, in the
area of policing, federal involvement since the 1990s has
been largely limited to specific program areas such as
community policing (Roth and Ryan 2000) and, recently,
counterterrorism (Richman 2006). Local agencies make
most consequential decisions about how much to spend
and how to deploy their resources across staffing, equip-
ment, investigations, and facilities outside the control of
state or federal mandates (Geller and Morris 1992; Peter-
son 1981). Cities also provide most of the financing for
their public safety programs out of own-source, general
3 Legal scholarship differentiates between two types of state-local
legal relationships. In home rule states, cities and other local gov-
ernments have relatively high degrees of autonomy in specific areas
such as their structural, functional, fiscal, and personnel powers,
whereas in Dillon’s rule states, local governments are limited to the
functions and powers explicitly granted to them by the state.
4 For more on the limitations on local taxation, see especially Fisher
(2003), which details the narrowing of fiscal differences across
states and localities in the last decades of the twentieth century.
On the fiscal impact of tax and expenditure limitations—including
California’s Proposition 13, Michigan’s Headlee Amendment, and
Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 1/2—see Mullins (2003) and Wallin
(2004).
fund revenues. For the cities in our data set, state and
federal intergovernmental revenues account for 81% of
their total spending on housing, 33% of their total spend-
ing on roads, and 27% of their total spending on health
and hospitals. But the comparable shares for policing and
fire are so small that they are not reported.5 And even if
every dollar of miscellaneous intergovernmental revenue
went to fire and policing, the comparable share would be
no larger than 21%. In all likelihood, the true figure is
considerably smaller.
Building on the literatures emphasizing cities’ con-
strained authority, we contend that partisanship will play
a larger role in policy areas where there is less shared au-
thority between local, state, and federal governments, and
a smaller role where shared authority is high. We focus on
the partisanship of a city’s mayor, since mayors (especially
in large cities) typically have significant agenda control as
well as budget-drafting authority (ICMA 2001). Mayors
are clearly not the only actors who participate in fiscal
policymaking, but they are especially influential. They
are also more easily observable.
We begin with the assumption that a mayor’s par-
tisanship is a strong determinant of his or her personal
fiscal policy preferences and that the mapping between
a mayor’s partisanship and policy preferences will have
some correspondence to the mapping that exists at the
national level. Political parties are coalitions of officehold-
ers that coordinate across levels of government (Aldrich
1995), a fact which is likely to induce some stability in par-
tisans’ policy preferences (Gerring 1998). Our approach
is agnostic with respect to how mayors obtain their par-
tisan identification and policy preferences. Nor do we
assume that partisans’ policy preferences are necessarily
identical at the national and local levels, but simply that
stances on a given issue are correlated across levels. Since
Republican officials at the national level tend to be more
concerned about reducing crime or cutting taxes, while
Democratic national officials are more concerned about
expanding social programs (Edsall 1991; Jacobson 1990;
Petrocik 1996), we expect similar tendencies to hold at the
local level. Regardless of the origins of these preferences,
their implication for our theory is simple: in the absence
of constraints, mayors from different parties would prefer
to enact different policies, and those policies correspond
to national partisan cleavages.
Yet we expect the presence of constraints on local au-
thority to moderate the ability of mayors to act upon
these preferences as they shape, promote, enact, and
5 Many federal and state public safety programs involve grants to
local police departments for specific activities (Richman 2006);
these funds are not separately identified in the fiscal data we employ.
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implement local policies. This leads us to hypothesize that
the influence of partisanship on local policy will be stronger
in areas like public safety where overlapping authority is less,
and weaker in areas like taxation and social policy where
overlapping authority is greater. We test this hypothesis
against two alternative hypotheses. Drawing from studies
at the national level, the first alternative contends that
partisanship is an important determinant of outcomes
in most local policy areas. The second, effectively a null
hypothesis, holds that partisanship is not an important
determinant of local outcomes and is consistent with the
perspective offered by Tiebout (1956) and Ferreira and
Gyourko (2009).
Methods and Data
This section outlines our empirical strategy and describes
the data sets we employ. The conceptual approach de-
scribed above implies a simple statistical model in which
the mayor’s partisanship affects patterns of revenues and
expenditures, and constraints on a city’s policy authority
dampen or enhance this relationship. However, mayoral
partisanship is not randomly assigned to cities, introduc-
ing the possibility of endogeneity. Cities that tend to elect
Democratic administrations are likely to be quite differ-
ent from cities that typically elect Republicans in both
observable and unobservable ways. In a statistical model,
we can (at least in theory) control for the observable
differences with the inclusion of covariates. But by defi-
nition, we cannot control for the unobserved differences,
leading to the possibility that these factors will bias our
estimates.
Our empirical approach seeks to isolate the factors
that influence the degree of discretion over policy while
addressing the complicating factors of endogeneity and
data availability. Specifically, we employ a regression dis-
continuity design (RDD), an increasingly common ap-
proach to making causal inferences from observational
data (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Folke 2009; Gerber,
Kessler, and Meredith forthcoming; Green et al. 2009;
Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klauuw 2001; Imbens and
Lemieux 2007; Leigh 2007; Meredith 2009; Mullainathan
and Washington 2009; Trounstine 2009; Warren 2009).
One recent review finds that RDD approaches consis-
tently recover experimental benchmarks (Cook, Shad-
dish, and Wong 2005), a strong assertion of their method-
ological value.6
6 Minimally, RDD should provide a lower bound on the impact
of partisanship since candidates who narrowly win are likely to
moderate their policy proposals in anticipation of the next election.
This article follows Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004)
and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) by treating election re-
sults as continuous variables measuring a city’s propen-
sity to elect a Democrat. However, as Lee, Moretti, and
Butler (2004) point out, there is a critical discontinuity
in election outcomes: Democrats who win 49.9% of the
two-candidate vote lose the election, while Democrats
who receive 50.1% of the two-candidate vote win. This
article uses close elections like these to estimate the in-
fluence of a narrow Democratic victory on subsequent
policy outcomes. In other words, the RD design allows
us to compare cities that are quite similar in their proba-
bility of electing a Democrat but that differ in the actual
partisanship of their mayor. By making the assumption
that policy outputs are a smooth function of the propen-
sity to elect a Democrat, we can exploit this discontinuity
to recover the local average treatment effect, where the
“treatment” is the election of a Democratic mayor. The
fact that this is a “local” average treatment effect indicates
that we are not estimating the overall impact of elect-
ing a Democrat, but instead the impact of a razor-tight
Democratic victory. As compared to other observational
research, this regression discontinuity approach markedly
reduces the threat of omitted variables. To bias RDD in-
ferences, any omitted variable would have to be unevenly
distributed at the point of the discontinuity (Green et al.
2009; Imbens and Lemieux 2007). There is no reason to
expect that cities where Democrats barely win have, for
example, markedly different crime rates, economic pat-
terns, or political institutions than cities where they barely
lose. Still, the richness of available covariates allows us to
confirm these assumptions for many observed variables.
The covariates also enable us to rule out the possibility
that our results are driven by strategic behavior or elec-
tion fraud in elections near the discontinuity (see also
Caughey and Sekhon 2010). Importantly, our RDD al-
lows us to test our hypotheses about how the presence of
constraints moderates the relationship between partisan-
ship and outcomes.7
Data Compilation
Testing our hypotheses requires a data set that com-
bines information on local government policy outputs,
Perhaps for that reason, this study is among the first to detect policy
impacts using this method (see also Leigh 2007 and Warren 2009).
7 An alternative approach would compare changes in city policies
after a partisan transition. However, we observe only 21 cases of
known party transitions, severely limiting the power of such tests. In
addition, focusing on transitions does not address the endogeneity
issue and hence allow the strong causal inferences supported by
RDD.
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mayoral election returns, policy characteristics, and fea-
tures of the local political and policy environment. City
elections (and mayoral elections in particular) occur at
different times under different rules, and no comprehen-
sive record of their results currently exists. Some cities
elect mayors every two years, some do so every four years,
and some forego direct mayoral elections entirely. Test-
ing for the influence of mayoral partisanship is harder
still, since the majority of U.S. cities use formally non-
partisan elections. We thus collected data on a city-by-
city basis, using information from election commissions,
archived newspaper articles, official city websites, the In-
ternational County/City Management Association, the
National Conference of State Legislatures, the 1987 Cen-
sus of Governments, and other sources. The resulting data
set is, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive data set
on direct mayoral elections for large U.S. cities from 1990
onward.8
The target universe is the 130 largest U.S. cities as
identified by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2007. The 130th
city is Brownsville, Texas, with a 2007 population of just
over 170,000 people. For each large-city mayoral elec-
tion beginning in 1990, we sought information on when
the election occurred, the votes received by the top four
candidates, the candidates’ party affiliations, and their
racial and ethnic backgrounds. We also recorded whether
the city’s elections were formally partisan or nonpartisan,
whether the winner was an incumbent, and whether city
hall changed parties after the election. Since some non-
partisan elections allow candidates to indicate their party
affiliation on the ballot, we recorded this information as
well.9 While only 14% of the elections in our sample took
8 As compared to the data set employed by Ferriera and Gyourko
(2009), this data set has advantages and disadvantages. Ferreira and
Gyourko’s sample extends back to 1950, and its sampling strategy
includes many smaller U.S. cities. By contrast, the data employed
here cover a shorter time frame and consider only the largest U.S.
cities. Yet the data used here are based on publicly available records
rather than surveys of local government officials. As a result, these
data are not subject to concerns about unreturned surveys, and the
threats of measurement error and response bias are much reduced.
Moreover, if the newspapers we rely on fail to indicate a candidate’s
partisanship in a single article, it is unlikely that partisanship was
central to the mayoral election. Our sample thus selects for cities
where partisanship has more potential to structure elections and
shape policy. An additional advantage of our data set is the richness
of the available covariates. Given the sample size, we are able to
collect data on institutional features that have not previously been
measured, such as the use of party labels on the ballot.
9 These elections are deemed “nonpartisan” because the political
parties do not formally nominate candidates for the general elec-
tion.
place in cities with formally partisan elections, 30% took
place in cities where party labels can appear on the bal-
lot. From the Census of Governments, we learn whether
the city has a mayor-council or council-manager system
as well as the size of the city council and the districting
scheme. Past research has found that those institutional
factors can influence politics and policy (e.g., Baqir 2002;
Fuchs 1992; Welch 1990), and they may well moderate the
impact of mayoral partisanship. Where cities elect mayors
through a run-off system, we included the results of the
final election. Of the target universe, we recovered some
information for 522 mayoral elections taking place in 120
cities.
However, not all of these elections are equally use-
ful in estimating the impact of partisan composition
on local fiscal policy. In 302 cases, we were not able to
obtain the party affiliation of the second-place candi-
date. In many of these cases, such information simply
does not exist, as many candidates for local office do not
declare their partisanship. This leaves us with 220 elec-
tions contested in 81 cities. Of this sample, we must also
drop cases where both candidates were from the same
party, leaving us with 134 elections from 59 cities. This
sample is by no means representative of U.S. cities as
a whole, or even of large U.S. cities. But our quantity
of interest—the impact of electing a Democrat over a
candidate from another party—is identified only for this
subsample.
To evaluate the characteristics of this limited sample,
we compare it to the original universe of elections using a
logistic regression where the dependent variable is inclu-
sion in our subsample. The cities in our sample have sig-
nificantly larger populations, lower population growth,
higher median household incomes, faster median house-
hold income growth, larger poor populations, and fewer
immigrants. Not surprisingly, the included cities are also
more likely to have partisan elections. The black popu-
lations of cities in the sample are not notably different
from the larger population of big cities, and conditional
on the factors above, included cities are no more likely to
be in a particular region of the country. Of the races that
made it into our sample, 108 were cases where a Demo-
crat ran against a Republican, while the remaining 26 saw
Democrats running against independents or minor-party
candidates. For each election in our sample, we calculate
the percentage of the votes for the top two candidates that
was received by the Democrat. On average, the Demo-
crat won 57% of the vote. However, there are 44 cases
where the Democrat lost and another 18 cases where the
Democrat won with less than 55% of the vote. Table SI1
provides descriptive statistics.
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Measuring Local Policy
Our measures of local fiscal policy are drawn from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Governments and
its Census of Governments, which provide detailed rev-
enue, expenditure, and employment data for U.S. local
governments from 1970 to 2006. By merging these data
with the mayoral election data described above, we are
able to observe a wide range of policies before and after
the mayoral election in question.
On the expenditure side, we focus on direct expen-
ditures in key spending categories, including policing,
fire, housing, healthcare, roads, parks, natural resources,
libraries, sanitation, administration, and code enforce-
ment. For each category and each year, we compute the
share of the total direct expenditures devoted to that pol-
icy area.10 Like past researchers, we use such spending
shares to measure changing policy priorities (e.g., Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005; Ja-
coby and Schneider 2001; Peterson 1981; Wolman, Strate,
and Melchior 1996, 213).11
We also consider a variety of measures of local rev-
enue policies, including total taxes per capita, logged total
tax collections, the share of local taxes that come from the
sales tax, the share of local taxes that come from the prop-
erty tax, and local taxes as a share of total local revenues.
Together, these measures allow us to observe changes in
the source and size of revenue streams. For instance, it
could be that Republican mayors prefer more targeted
revenue sources and so increase users’ fees while shift-
ing away from broad-based taxes. By analyzing the share
of local revenues that come from taxes, we will detect
such shifts. Coarsely, we will also be able to identify shifts
in more progressive revenues sources (such as property
taxes) as well as more regressive revenues sources (such
as sales taxes).
Finally, we consider a number of policy outcomes
that deal less with how cities allocate their budget dol-
lars across policy areas, and more with how dollars are
allocated to spending items within a given policy area.
Specifically, we consider changes in the number of po-
lice department employees, the share of public employees
who are in the police department, and changes in po-
10 Modeling changes in spending shares allows us to account for the
vast differences in the services cities provide, since we are modeling
differences from each city’s baseline spending level.
11 We exclude capital and construction expenditures as such ex-
penditures commonly reflect decisions made in previous years. We
would not, for example, want to consider an increased construction
budget under one mayor to be the result of her election if such in-
creases were actually budgeted by her predecessor. Studying direct
current expenditures allows us to capture that portion of each city’s
budget that is most directly shaped by the current mayor.
lice employee pay as a share of total payrolls. We include
these additional outcomes to investigate the possibility
that even if Democratic and Republican mayors are con-
strained in the amounts they spend on various policy
areas, they may still differ in their approaches to public
employment and personnel policies.12
Table SI2 describes the numerous measures used to
create the dependent variables, with spending categories
in the top section, revenues in the middle section, and em-
ployment in the bottom section. As the first column makes
clear, in the average year, policing receives more direct
current expenditures than any other spending category,
followed by roads and fire protection. The final column
reports the ratio of policy-specific intergovernmental rev-
enues (as reported in the Annual Survey of Governments)
to direct spending in that category. While federal, state,
and local governments have numerous mechanisms for
controlling local policy, including those discussed above,
we expect money—and the conditions attached to grants
and intergovernmental transfers—to exert an especially
powerful constraint on the ability of mayors to shape local
policy in a partisan direction.
Results
In this section, we report the results of our empirical anal-
yses. We first establish our baseline estimates of the rela-
tionship between local partisanship and city fiscal policy
by focusing on an area of spending where one important
form of constraint—intergovernmental transfers—is low
and hence where we expect a strong partisan impact. That
area is public safety. We then test our core hypothesis by
comparing this estimated relationship across several pol-
icy areas that vary in their degree of overlapping authority.
This section and the Supplemental Information provide
additional robustness tests for the key findings, showing
that they are not driven by the handling of missing co-
variates, outliers, observations far from the discontinuity,
or many potentially omitted variables.
Modeling Spending on Public Safety
Cities vary in their functional responsibilities, a fact which
poses significant challenges for cross-city comparisons
(Peterson 1981). In part, we confront this concern by
12 Large literatures investigate local government personnel policies
in general, and police department staffing strategies in particular.
These studies consider such factors as collective bargaining (Methe
and Perry 1980), asset specificity and transactions costs (Brown
and Potoski 2003), and management science (Green and Kolesar
2004). Our review of these literatures failed to uncover any that
examine partisan political influences.
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focusing on core city functions such as policing, fire pro-
tection, libraries, parks, and roads, which are common
across most large cities. We also specify the dependent
variables in our analyses as changes in spending shares,
revenue, and employment outcomes in the three years
after a mayoral election, a choice which means that our
analyses will not be confounded by baseline differences
in cities’ functional responsibilities. For all analyses, the
baseline year is the fiscal year during which the election
took place. The changes are continuous variables and
can reasonably be modeled using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS).
When considering regression discontinuities, the
critical independent variables are the indicator for the
discontinuity—in this case, whether the Democrat won
the election—and the underlying continuous measure of
support for the Democratic candidate. This continuous
measure is known in RDD research as the “forcing” vari-
able; it is operationalized as the winner’s share of the votes
received by the top two candidates. Ideally, we would focus
only on observations that are very close to the disconti-
nuity, reducing model dependence (Green et al. 2009;
Imbens and Lemieux 2007, 616). But given the relatively
small sample size, we need to rely to some extent on ob-
servations that are more distant from the discontinuity.
Our models thus need to capture the underlying func-
tional relationship between partisanship and fiscal poli-
cies across a wide range of election outcomes. To do so,
we include not only a measure of the percent of the elec-
torate supporting the Democrat, but also squared and
cubed measures of Democratic support to account for this
potentially complex relationship.13 Following past proce-
dure (e.g., Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004), we also interact
these measures with the binary indicator for Democratic
victories, which allows the various functions of the per-
cent Democratic to vary across the discontinuity. This
approach reduces the chance that our results stem from
mis-specifying the relationship between Democratic sup-
port and policy choices.
Table 1 presents an initial model of the change in the
share of spending devoted to police. In part, we begin
with police spending because it is the largest spending
category for the cities in our sample, accounting for 11%
of all direct operating expenditures on average. It is also a
theoretically informative starting place. It is a policy area
characterized by relatively low levels of overlapping au-
thority, so if partisanship can influence any spending area,
it should influence policing. The model uses multiple im-
putation to prevent the deletion of eight observations
13 The results are robust to the inclusion of quartic terms or the
removal of cubed terms as well.
with missing values for at least one variable (King et al.
2001; Schafer 1997). The standard errors are clustered by
city (Wooldridge 2003).
In theory, the various functions of the Democratic
candidate’s vote share are the only covariates necessary to
ensure an unbiased estimate of the impact of a Democratic
mayor in our RD design. Still, as with randomized exper-
iments, the use of pretreatment covariates can improve
efficiency and remove covariate imbalances that occur by
chance (Green 2009). Our core analyses thus condition on
a handful of covariates, although the robustness checks in
the Supplemental Information show that our results do
not depend on these specification choices. In 26 of these
elections, the opponent is an independent rather than a
Republican, so we condition on an indicator variable for
those cases. City fiscal years most commonly end in June,
but to account for heterogeneity across cities, we condi-
tion on an additional indicator variable for the 25% of
cities in our sample whose fiscal years end in December. In
our initial modeling, we also condition on the city’s 1990
population, its percent black, its logged median house-
hold income, and its baseline intergovernmental revenue
per capita. In interpreting these results, it is important to
keep in mind that the indicator variable for a Democratic
victory is interacted with the three continuous measures
of Democratic support.14
The first model indicates that all else equal, a city
where the Democrat just wins the mayoralty should ex-
pect its spending on police to drop by 2.3 percentage
points three fiscal years later. This result is statistically
significant, with a 95% confidence interval that runs from
0.5 percentage points to 4.0 percentage points. It is sub-
stantively large as well, as it reflects a spending shift of 1.2
standard deviations in terms of the dependent variable.
Figure 1 illustrates the regression discontinuity design
and reports our empirical estimate graphically. The black
dots represent the observed change in police spending (on
the y-axis) as a function of the percentage of the vote re-
ceived by the Democrat (on the x-axis). The open circles
show our OLS model’s prediction for each city election
and illustrate the magnitude of the estimated disconti-
nuity. The figure makes it clear that there is a sharp
discontinuity—a relative decline in police spending—
when Democratic mayors narrowly win. The figure also
illustrates that the difference is driven more by the av-
erage increase in anticrime spending under Republicans
(1.8 percentage points) than by the average decrease un-
der Democrats (−0.4 percentage points). The results are
14 Also, the measure of Democratic support is recentered by sub-
tracting 0.50 to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients.
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TABLE 1 OLS Estimates, DV = Change in the Share of City Spending on Police, 134 City
Elections
 SE  SE
Intercept 0.008 0.114 0.017 0.008
Democrat Wins −0.023 0.009 −0.020 0.009
Pct Democrat 0.299 0.275 0.278 0.269
Pct Democrat Squared 2.299 2.658 2.189 2.625
Pct Democrat Cubed 5.114 6.262 4.956 6.182
Independent Loses −0.001 0.004
December FY −0.004 0.004
Logged 1990 Population −0.005 0.002
Pct Black 1990 −0.011 0.011
Logged Median Income 1990 0.008 0.011
Intergovernmental Revenue per Capita 0.001 0.002
Democrat wins x Pct. Democrat −0.313 0.319 −0.302 0.308
Democrat wins x Pct. Democrat −1.794 2.683 −1.731 2.645
Squared
Democrat wins x Pct. Democrat −6.152 6.388 −5.889 6.323
Cubed



























Note: Black dots depict the bivariate relationship between each city’s Democratic support
and the subsequent three-year change in police dpending. Open dots depict the predicted
change from the baseline RDD model.
not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of other inde-
pendent variables, as the second model in Table 1 shows.
Table SI3 reports comparable results for the change in
the share of spending devoted to fire protection, the other
major category of public safety. It, too, consumes a signif-
icant share of local revenues, and is subject to relatively
few federal and state mandates. These results demonstrate
a similar effect of a narrow Democratic victory: in cities
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FIGURE 2 OLS Estimates, Effect of a Democratic Victory on
Outcomes





















Note: Conditional on covariates in Table 1, estimated on multiply imputed data sets with
standard errors clustered by city.
where a Democrat barely wins, we can expect a 1.0 per-
centage point drop in spending on fire protection, with
a 95% confidence interval from 0.04 percentage points
to 2.0 percentage points. Again, this impact appears to
be driven more by increases under Republicans than de-
creases under Democrats.
Modeling Changes in Spending Shares
We then apply the same statistical methods, including
multiple imputation and standard errors clustered by
city, to the full set of dependent variables. Figure 2 ex-
tracts the estimated effect of a Democratic victory for
each fitted model. Alongside the findings for police and
fire spending, we see a few suggestive (though not statis-
tically significant) tendencies: Democratic mayors spend
more, on average, on roads, housing, and administration.
They spend less on natural resources, and they have lower
police pay and fewer police employees. Democratic may-
ors appear to rely less on sales taxes, although again, none
of these differences nears statistical significance. The null
findings for revenue-related measures are consistent with
the assessment that revenue decisions are strongly limited
by legal constraints (Ladd and Yinger 1989, chap. 6).
Partisan Elections
We now consider the possibility that partisanship mat-
ters only in places where it is especially salient, either
because the elections are partisan or because party af-
filiations appear on the ballot. In these more explicitly
partisan elections, voters have easier access to partisan
information and elected mayors may feel more account-
able to partisan constituents. Forty-one percent of the
elections in our data set take place in cities with parti-
san institutions. Estimating a separate model for these 52
observations, we see an impact of 4.1 percentage points
on police spending, with a 95% confidence interval from
0.87 to 7.4 percentage points. By contrast, when we con-
sider formally nonpartisan elections (but where the may-
oral candidates’ partisanship is known), we retrieve a re-
sult that is nearly zero. The difference between the two
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FIGURE 3 Effect of a Democratic Victory on Police Spending for
Varying Window Size
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estimates is 4.3 percentage points and is itself statistically
significant at the p < .10 level. We also detect a stronger
impact of partisanship in the 60% of cities where party
labels appear on the ballot, although the difference with
cities that do not provide that information is not as pro-
nounced, and is not statistically significant. The finding
that partisanship matters most when it is highly salient
also provides a clue about why these results differ from
those of Ferriera and Gyourko (2009), whose data set in-
cludes many elections where the salience of partisanship
is likely to be low. We develop this point at length in the
Supplemental Information. The Supplemental Informa-
tion also demonstrates that other measures of the local
and state political environment do not moderate parti-
sanship’s local impact.
Robustness
We now summarize the results of a series of robustness
checks which further probe our main findings and help
to rule out the possibility that our results are artifacts
of any particular empirical approach. Full details of the
robustness checks are presented in the Supplemental In-
formation.
• Observations far from the discontinuity: when
using RDD, one key robustness check is to
vary the distance from the discontinuity within
which observations are included in the analysis
(Green et al. 2009; Imbens and Lemieux 2007).
Doing so reduces the number of observations but
also makes the results less model dependent. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the estimated impact of electing a
Democratic mayor on police spending as distance
from the discontinuity (and thus the number of ob-
servations) grows. It shows that the effect is highly
robust to the subset of elections considered.
• Multiple imputation: our results are not sensitive
to the exclusion of eight observations for which we
impute values on a few variables.
• Outliers: our results are not sensitive to the exclu-
sion of any one observation.
• Omitted variables: our results are not sensitive to
the inclusion (or exclusion) of dozens of poten-
tial covariates that measure demographic charac-
teristics, region, local political institutions, or the
partisan environment.
• Time horizon, years, and opponents: as expected,
our results are substantively smaller but still sta-
tistically significant when we shorten the time
horizon from three to two years after the elec-
tion. The results grow slightly stronger when we
only consider elections between a Democrat and a
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Republican. They are not sensitive to limiting our
sample to pre-2002 elections, ruling out the possi-
bility of a confounding federal role after September
11, 2001.
Implications and Conclusions
In 1999, Republican Paul Coble took the mayoralty in
Raleigh, North Carolina, after a narrow victory. Its crime
rate—7,307 crimes per 100,000 people—was just below
the median among cities considered here. During his term
in office, Coble increased police spending from 11.1% of
the budget to 14.1% of the budget two years later. In the
same year, Fort Wayne, Indiana, narrowly elected Demo-
crat Graham Richard. In contrast to Raleigh’s experience,
during Mayor Richard’s first term Fort Wayne saw a de-
cline in the share of the budget devoted to the police, from
18.1% to 14.4% of the budget over three years. The results
above strongly suggest that these changes are not idiosyn-
cratic. When Democrats narrowly win the mayor’s chair,
spending on policies such as policing—a policy area de-
fined by low levels of overlapping authority—commonly
declines relative to total spending. There might not be a
Republican way to collect the trash, but there is a Repub-
lican way to spend on policing and fire protection.
Party labels are not meaningless in urban politics,
but nor do they convey the same information as national
party labels. Our findings have important implications
for questions of responsiveness and accountability. They
demonstrate that local governments are quite constrained
in their ability to respond to changing preferences within
their cities. When partisans assume political power in a
large city, we would expect the newly empowered elites—
who are responsive to different constituencies and who
likely hold very different policy preferences than their
partisan opponents—to seek major changes in city pol-
icy. In most policy areas, however, we do not observe
systematic differences in policy outcomes following the
narrow victory of a Democratic or Republican mayor, as
measured by the share of a city’s budget going to that
particular spending or revenue category. This stability in
spending and revenue patterns is consistent with our ex-
planation that in most policy areas, the structural and
political constraints imposed on local government offi-
cials largely nullify their ability to enact their preferred
policies or respond to the preferences of partisan majori-
ties in the local electorate.
From the perspective of assigning responsibility and
holding elected officials accountable for policy outcomes,
some observers will find these results disheartening. Even
if local government officials want to change policy, it is not
at all clear that they have the formal or informal powers
needed to make the kinds of changes citizens might want.
In a separation of powers system like the United States,
assigning responsibility is difficult and complex. When we
add the kinds of ambiguity that arise from the overlapping
authorities and political constraints facing local officials,
the problem of accountability becomes still more acute.
The major exception is in the area of public safety,
particularly spending on police and fire protection, where
overlapping authority with federal and state actors is rela-
tively low. Here, we find that narrow Republican victories
are associated with a substantial and statistically signifi-
cant increase in the share of city budgets going to these
functions. These results are strongest in cities where par-
ties play a formal role in nominating candidates. Under
these conditions, the relationship between what decision
makers want and the outcomes they produce is much
clearer. Holding them accountable for the outcomes they
produce is a reasonable goal.
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